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International Game Tech., Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 18
(March 27, 2008) 1
EMPLOYMENT - RETALIATION & REMEDIES
Summary
This opinion rejects International Game Technology’s (hereinafter “IGT”) challenge to
the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Nevada False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provisions (hereinafter “FCA”). The Court
also clarifies the meaning of the statute at issue, NRS 357.250.
Disposition/Outcome
Petition for writ of mandamus denied.
Factual and Procedural History
As an employee of IGT, James McAndrews (plaintiff) suspected that IGT “falsified tax
records in order to fraudulently conceal or decrease the amount of sales and use tax it
owed to the state.” 2 He filed an action under Nevada’s FCA and the court found
McAndrews failed to state a claim under the FCA because the Nevada tax department
governs revenue statutes and McAndrews’ disagreement with IGT’s interpretation did not
create a claim under the FCA.
As a result of McAndrews filing an action against IGT, his work was suspended and he
was only allowed on the premises to receive paychecks. After the opinion was issued,
McAndrews was terminated and he brought this action against IGT for retaliation.
IGT filed a motion to dismiss, “arguing that NRS 357.250(2)(b) holds an employer liable
only if it harassed, threatened with demotion or termination, or otherwise coerced the
complaining employee into participation in fraudulent activity,” 3 and McAndrews failed
to allege IGT pressured him into participation in a fraudulent activity. The district court
denied the motion to dismiss. IGT filed a petition with the Court for a writ of mandamus.
Discussion
The Court begins by explaining a writ of mandamus “is available to compel the
performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station 4 or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” 5 If there is an
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adequate and speedy legal remedy, the writ relief is not available. 6 The court generally
declines to consider writ petitions that challenge a district court’s order denying a motion
to dismiss because “an appeal from the final judgment typically constitutes an adequate
and speedy legal remedy.” 7 The Court holds, “an appeal is not an adequate and speedy
legal remedy, given the early stages of litigation and policies of judicial administration.” 8
As mentioned above, IGT argued the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory requirement of
NRS 357.250(2)(b), interpreting the statute to require McAndrews to plead and show IGT
pressured him into acting fraudulently in order to recover. The Court concludes that this
subsection of the statute “qualifies or limits the liability imposed in subsection 1 by
providing that an employee may recover for retaliatory conduct only if (a) the employee
voluntarily engaged in the protected whistleblower activity, and (b) to the extent he
participated in any fraudulent activity, his employer pressured him to do so.” 9
The Court further finds that a more “plausible” interpretation of the statute to be, “if the
employee participated in fraudulent activity, he cannot recover unless his employer
pressured him to do so, but if the employee did not participate in any fraudulent activity,
the subsection does not apply and he need not show employer pressure.” 10 The
subsection allows an employee that did participate in the fraudulent activity to recover if
he can show the employer harassed, threatened, or coerced his participation. The Court
looks to the legislative intent of the FCA—prevent employers from precluding lawful
FCA disclosures and from taking retaliatory employment action against employees who
make such lawful disclosures. 11 If the Court adopted IGT’s interpretation, it would leave
employers free from liability and run counter to the policy behind the FCA.
The Court reads that statute as applying to “any such negative employer actions, whether
or not harassment, threats, or coercion occurred.” 12 In addition, “if the employee engaged
in fraudulent activity, he can recover under NRS 357.250 ‘only if’ he was harassed,
threatened, or coerced by the employer into the fraudulent activity in the first instance.” 13
Conclusion
The Court denies IGT’s petition for a writ of mandamus. NRS 357.250(2)(b) “does not
limit recovery to only those employees whose employers pressured them into such
activity. Instead, it simply does not apply to employees who did not engage in fraudulent
activity.” 14 The district court did not have to dismiss the complaint and IGT is not
entitled to a writ of mandamus.
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